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Abstract. This study seeks to test the existence of the crowding-out (or- in) hypothesis in a sample
of 17 Emerging Europe countries divided in two panels. The study employs a panel autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) model based on three estimators, Mean Group Estimator (MG), Pooled Mean
Group (PMG) and Dynamic Fixed Effect (DFE), in order to evaluate the of stability of short run and
long run coefficients using consistently compiled public borrowing and private investment data between
2000 and 2019. The empirical findings of the paper generally confirm the existence of a crowding out
effect in both long run and short run in European post-transition countries, and in the long run for
European transition countries. More specifically, elasticity of private investment with respect to public
debt is greater in the European transition countries than in the European post-transition countries.
However, the findings on the crowding out (in) effect of government spending and economic growth on
private investment are mixed and conflicting in both the long run and the short run. Accordingly, the
study recommends that selected countries should reassess their austerity agendas employed for lowering
debt levels, and follow new strategies for managing public debt burden.
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1. Introduction
The rapid increase in public sector debt is a phenomenon that has received considerable at-
tention in both theoretical and empirical research, as well as among economic policy makers
in recent decades. The great global imbalances that preceded the outbreak of the latest global
financial crisis (2008-09) contributed to a rapid increase in government borrowing. In the litera-
ture, the term “crowding out effect” is very well-known where it refers to how rising public bor-
rowing crowds out private demand. However, there is some ambiguity about the crowding out
effect because there exists growing evidence about the crowding-in effect in different countries.
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Although the importance of link between private investment and public investment has been
widely examined, most of those studies, quite disappointingly, have been done for the region
as a whole. Specifically, our research provides a valuable contribution to this area, especially
in regard to European post-transition countries. Most empirical investigations have tested the
crowding out (or-in) hypothesis for highly indebted and poor countries. There has been much
less research on modestly indebted transition countries. In addition, many of these European
transition countries have undergone significant on-going political and structural changes. Due
to this fact, the rise of public debt might be a present burden in near future for these countries.
This study aims to explore the link between private investment and public borrowing in emerg-
ing Europe by examining the validity of the crowding out (or-in) hypothesis. More specifically,
this study focuses on common long run and short run coefficients in eight selected European
transition countries (Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia Serbia, Montenegro,
North Macedonia and Moldova) and nine European post-transition countries (Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Czechia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). Consequently, the
study seeks to ascertain whether an increase in public debt leads to a decrease (increase) in
private investment, both in the long run and the short run. The PMG is used to test the
stability of short run and long run variables employing consistently compiled public borrowing
and private investment data.
The countries included in our study share similar cultural/historical legacies and socioeco-
nomic characteristics. In some countries, the process of joining to the EU has already been
completed (the European post-transition countries) while in others it is still in progress (the
European transition countries). The literature on this issue remains scarce for the both groups
of countries due to the recent establishment of government and public debt management poli-
cies, as well as recent public sector management reforms. However, taking into consideration
that major structural changes in public debt management policies for the region have been
happening for at least twenty years now (and that public investment are not more and less
complementary to private investment but rather operate at different levels of efficiency) it
seems appropriate to address this issue now. In fact, this study employs a panel ARDL model
based on three estimators (MG, PMG and DFE) which provide certain advantages over the
other types of dynamic panel models. In particular, there remains a lack of recent empirical
studies, in both the short run and long run that have explored the crowding out (or–in) effect.
The studies that do exist simply do not offer convincing arguments to explain the negative and
positive relationships between public borrowings on private investment.
2. Literature review
The crowding-out (or-in) effect and its different forms have been studied for more than four
decades now and remains a point of interest for many researchers. As a result, there is a
substantial body of literature on this topic derived from theories of monetary and fiscal policy.
There is a clear short run correlation between public debt and interest rates [2]. Generally,
increases in public debt lead to higher interest rates. Modigliani and Ando [30] attempted to
evaluate the crowding-out effect more closely. They suggest that crowding out is only one of
many effects that occurs in the process of public expenditure growth via bond issuance. This
resulted in the creation of the crowding-out hypothesis as we more and less know it today. For
example, Borensztein [10] was one of the first researchers who attempted to test the relationship
between public debt and private investments. His study concluded that public debt burden acts
as a disincentive for private investment.
A number of crowding out (or in) studies exist for individual countries (i.e. [6, 7, 16, 24];
etc.). The majority of these studies employed Vector Error Correction Modeling (VEMC) and
Error Correction Modeling (ECM) to explore the links between public borrowing and private
investments. However, this study focuses on the validity of the crowd-out (crowd-in) hypothesis
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in a cross-section of heterogeneous countries. Revealingly, recent empirical studies have shown
mixed findings at a global level when testing the “crowding out” (or-in) effect hypothesis. For
instance, one of those studies focused on channels of interest rate and models of crowding out
[16]. They showed that government spending puts upward pressure on interest rates which in
turn leads to lower levels of private investment. Thus, the debate about the “crowding out”
(or-in) effect is not conclusive, and in fact, has initiated new controversies related to the short
run and long run effects between public borrowings and private investment. The scope of the
studies have varied significantly from one study to another in terms of the proxy variables
included in the estimates of the influence that public borrowings have on private investment.
Table 1 shows a brief summary of the current literature that is relevant to this research:
Deshpande’s [14] research reveals the negative impact that public debt has on private invest-
ment while the time variable only has positive impact on investment until 1984. A similar study
was conducted by [6] who identified the crowding out effect in eleven countries, while in eight
countries he identified the crowding (in) effect. There was no statistical significance regarding
the crowding out (or-in) effect in the other six countries of the study. In another study, authors
[1] observed a crowding-in effect as it relates to public investment on private investment in eight
countries, with a crowding out effect being found in nine countries, respectively. Emran and
Farazi [17] investigated the causal effect of public borrowing and private investment by utiliz-
ing cross sectional data,. Their study indicated that private credit is reduced by $ 1.40 if the
government increases its borrowing by $ 1.00. Elmendorf and Mankiw [16] examined interest
rate channels and models of crowding out. They found that government spending puts upward
pressure on interest rates and leads lower private investment. Broner, et.al. [11] found evidence
of the crowding-out hypothesis in Euro zone countries, taking into consideration all the events
surrounding the financial crisis from 2007. In their examination of the crowding out hypothesis,
the authors concluded that the demand for public borrowing is higher among poorer Euro zone
members. Erdem, et.al. [19] noted a negative correlation between public debt and government
expenditures in the Euro zone between 2000 and 2015.
In addition, the crowding out hypothesis was also confirmed by the negative relationship
between budget deficits and private investment. This indicates that budget deficit increases
caused by large public debt burdens and debt servicing activities, leads to the crowding out
of private investment. All of these relationships were confirmed for the short run period. In
one of the most significant studies, [21] it is shown that lower levels of private investment are
associated with higher levels of government debt.
On the other end of the debate, there are some researchers who found complementarity
between public borrowing and private investment, thus supporting the hypothesis about the
crowding-in effect rather than the crowding out effect. Aschauer [7] found that public invest-
ment crowds-in private investment. Similarly, two other studies also support the existence of
the crowding-in effect public on private investment [3] and [5]. Authors [28] found a greater
crowding-in effect in developing rather than developed countries by public investment.
In conclusion, it is clear that the existing empirical literature on this topic provides limited
and conflicted evidence regarding a crowding out (or-in) effect that public borrowing has on
private investment, particularly in European transition countries. European post-transition
countries have been much less explored. Our study follows a different approach than the
previous empirical studies listed in Table 1.
3. Methodology
Following some recent studies [11, 19], this study tests the existence the crowding-out (or- in)
hypothesis in a sample of 17 emerging Europe countries divided in two panels. The study em-
ploys a cross country sample of eight selected European transition countries (Albania, Belarus,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia,) and
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Table 1: Review of selected empirical studies
Author(s) Time span Countries Econometric method Variables
[3] 1979-1988 14 OECD coun-
tries
Panel Data Technique,
FE model, RE model
government consumption, pub-
lic investment, private invest-
ment
[14] 1971- 1991 13 highly in-
debted countries
(HIPCs)
Panel Data Technique Import of capital goods, public
debt, private investment, public
sector investment






to GDP, Government Size,
Economic Structure, Monetary
Conditions, Forex Regime,
Trade Openness, freedom of
Exchange in Financial Market
[1] 1960- 2014 17 OECD coun-
tries
VAR estimation GDP, Gross fixed capital forma-
tion , direct taxes, inflation rate,
social contributions received





private credit, borrowing by the
government, growth rate of per
capita income, inflation




private saving/ investment rate,
gross government debt, fiscal in-
dicators, long-term (sovereign)
real interest rate, trade open-
ness




Panel Data Technique Government capital formation
expenditure, private invest-
ment, budget deficit, inflation
rate, GDP
[11] 2000-2012 Euro zone coun-
tries
Panel Data Technique Public debt, private investment
[19] 2000-2015 Euro zone coun-
tries
Panel Data Technique Public debt, private investment,
government expenditure, real
interest rate, growth rate on pri-
vate investment
[5] 1992-2015 4 countries in
East Africa
A panel ARDL model Public debt as % of GDP, pri-
vate investment, Human cap-
ital development, GDP, infla-
tion, credit to private sector,
corruption control.
[21] 1998-2014 69 countries Error correction model investment-to-GDP ratio,
investment-to-assets ratio,
government debt over GDP,
Investment, Cash Flow, and
Sales
Source: Compiled by the authors
nine European post transition countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). The sample of countries included in this study was determined
by the availability of data.
In the first stages of our econometric analysis, the stationarity of the series is checked with
three different the panel unit roots as follows: Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS, 2003) test [22], Levin, Lin
and Chu (LLC, 2002) test [26] and Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test [36]. The LLC test [26] assumes
that the structures of all panel units are homogeneous, whereby the null hypothesis assumes
that all observation units contain a unit root (H0 : ρi = 0 ∀i) while the alternative hypothesis
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assumes that all panel units are stationary (H1 : ρi = ρ < 0 ∀i). In the IPS test [22], under
the null hypothesis it is presumed that all series’ are non-stationary, while under alternative
hypothesis, a fraction of the series is stationary. This test for stationarity is convenient as
it allows panel data to be unbalanced. In other words, the IPS test assumes cross-sectional
independence where heterogeneity allows for serial correlation structure of the error term and
for the form of sole deterministic effects [22].
The IPS test [22] allows heterogeneous autoregressive coefficients within the alternative
hypothesis. It is presumed that under the null hypothesis all series are non-stationary (H0 :
ρi = 0 ∀i) against the alternative hypothesis of H1 : ρi < 0 where i = 1, 2, 3. . . N1 ;ρi = 0,
i = N1+1, N2+2, . . . N . In other words, the IPS test [22] relaxes the assumption of homogeneity
and assumes that the panel units do not converge to the equilibrium level at the same rate.
One of the reasons for selecting the Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test [36] was that it allows cross
sectional dependence of the contemporaneous correlation where the null hypothesis assumes
that all observation units contain a unit root while the alternative hypothesis assumes that all
panel units are stationary.
In the second stages of econometric analysis, this study adopts the first generation hetero-
geneous panel cointegration test developed by Pedroni (Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test,
[32]) and Kao Residual Cointegration Test [23] for panel data analysis to predict the presence
of long-run relationships among variables. The application of the Pedroni (1999) test considers
seven residual-based tests, divided into two types. The first types covers four panel test statis-
tics, based on the within-dimension approach (the panel rho statistics, the panel v-statistics, the
panel ADF statistics and the panel PP statistics). It assumes a common regression coefficient
across all cross-sections or to be the same across all the cross sections.
The second type covers three group test statistics based on the between-dimension ap-
proach (the group rho statistics, the group PP statistics and the the group ADF statistics)
which assumes that the regression coefficients vary across cross-sections and allows greater
heterogeneity.
In both cases, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is tested against the alternative hypoth-
esis of cointegration in heterogeneous panels. For instance, if the null hypothesis is rejected then
the relevant variables are cointegrated for all cross-sections (within-dimension approach) and
cointegration among the variables exists for at least one of the cross-sections (between-dimension
approach). Furthermore, Pedroni [32] assumes that individual units are heterogeneous. In that
case, a cointegration equation of the model can be seen from equation 1:
yi,t = αi+δit+β1ix1it+β2ix2it+. . .+βMixMit+eit i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T m = 1, . . . ,M (1)
where T refers to the number of observations over time, N denotes the number of individual
countries in panel, and M is the number of regression variables. The slope coefficients of
β1i, β2i, . . . , βMi in the model can vary across individual counties of the panel. In the equation 1,
parameter αi denotes the member specific intercept, or fixed that also can vary across individual
members. The model allows that parameter δi presents deterministic time trend specific for
individual counties of panel.
In addition to Pedroni’s cointegration test [32], the study employed Kao Residual Cointe-
gration Test [23]. It refers to residuals from static regression with fixed effects, which include
potentially co-integrated variables, retrieves residuals to test whether a unit root exists via the
ADF test.
If there is no cointegration or if there are doubts about the validity of the estimates from
the previous method(s), the ARDL estimators are recommended as suitable estimators for such
panel settings. Accordingly, three estimators are utilized to assess the relationship between
private investment and economic growth (MG, PMG and DFE) in order to explore the existence
of stable short run and long run coefficients.
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If there is no-cointegration or there is doubt about the validity of the estimates from the
previous method(s), the ARDL estimators are recommended as suitable estimators for such
panel setting. Accordingly, three estimators are utilized to assess the relationship between
private investment and economic growth (MG, PMG and DFE) to explore the existence of
stability of short run and long run coefficients.
There are few assumptions when utilizing the PMG estimator that need to be made: a)
between the dependent and explanatory variables a long run relationship exists; b) there is a
fixed effect heterogenity in the long run specification, and c) the residual of the model should
be serially uncorrelated so that explanatory variables are treated as exogenous [34]. The PMG
estimator is seen as an intermediate estimator which allows for homogeinity in the long run
coefficients, but imposes heterogeneity in the short run coefficients and the error variances.
However, the MG estimator assumes heterogeinity of all coefficients, intercepts and slopes,
and estimates different coefficients for each panel separately while unweighted averages of the
individual coefficients are computed for the whole panel. The DFE estimator developed by [34]
have some similarities with the PMG estimator. In fact, the DFE estimator restricts the speed
of adjustment and equalizes the short term coefficients. In the long run, it imposes restrictions
on the slope coefficient and requires error variance to be equal.
MG estimators [33] allows for the slopes and intercepts to be different across counties. In
this technique, coefficients are calculated as unweighted means of the estimated coefficients for
separate individual countries. Therefore, no restrictions are imposed; rather coefficients are
allowed to be heterogeneous in both the long-run and short-run and are subsequently allowed
to vary. The only prerequisites are related to the need to obtain large time-series datasets,
and the need for cross-country dimensions to be sufficient. Moreover, average estimators (MG)
for small N are prone to outliers and small model permutations. Initially, the MG model as
developed by [33] can be written as:
yi,t = βi + β
′xit + uit i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T (2)
where yit denotes the vector of the dependent variable, xit is the matrix of regressors and
uit is the vector of residuals.
It is further obtained by first using OLS to get the individual estimates of the slope parameters.




























δ′ijxi,t−1 + µi + uit (5)
Where xi,t denotes the k×1 vector of explanatory variables for group i, δ′ij denotes the k×1
vector of heterogeneous coefficients, and λij denotes the coefficients with the lagged dependent
variable. µi is a label for fixed effects. To get the relationship between private investment and
public debt the panel ARDL model employed here can be expressed as follows:
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β2xi,t−l + uit (6)
In the light of the previous model (Eq. 6), we follow a similar form of re-parameterization
that was done by [4] which is specified as follows:











Where the subscript (i, t) refers to country (from 1 to 17) and time period between 2000 and
2019, respectively, y is the the main dependent variable GFXPrivate, d is public debt, x denotes
two control variables: government spending and GDP growth rate. The short run coefficients of
the lagged dependent variable (λ, λ′ and λ′′) represent public debt, government spending and
GDP growth rate while y1 and y2 are the long run coefficients public debt and other control
variables. And finally, φi denotes speed of adjustment parameter. The main dependent variable
GFXPrivate (Gross fixed capital formation, private sector as % of GDP, World Bank’s World
Development Indicators, World bank database) is used as a proxy for private investment. It
is included in the model because the same variable was utilized in order to explore the impact
of the crowd out (in) effect in 17 OECD countries through VAR analysis [1] and one other
the study that used of a panel of 116 developing countries between 1980 and 2006 [12]. This
variable is taken to check for the possible existence of a potential displacement effect of Gross
fixed capital formation caused by increases of public debt.
There have been previous empirical studies that have explored the relationship between
private investment and public borrowing. Almost all of them used the same or similar variables
in their models as we did in this analysis. Public debt was proxied by the general government
consolidated gross debt as a % of GDP (PDGDP, IMF World Economic Outlook) to measure
its impact on private investment. It assumes that this variable is a good predictor changes in
private investment. It also offers a theoretical background that suggests that increases in public
debt put upward pressure on interest rates which then lead to declines in private investment
[4, 14, 21]. However, the available evidence shows mixed results that causes ambiguity.
The control variables of government expenditure (GOVEXPEND) and annual GDP growth
rate (RGROWTH) are included in the econometric model. The variable of government expendi-
ture (GOVEXPEND, World Bank’s World Development Indicators, World bank database) was
represented through the sum of all expenditures as a percentage of GDP that the government of
any country has made. This variable is included in our model because there is some theoretical
beliefs about the crowding-in effect (The Keynesian theory) that public investment through
government spending increases private investment through the multiplier effect. However, in
some empirical studies, there is a dilemma about the relationship between government capital
expenditure and private investment. For example, [12, 7, 9] and [19] supported the view that
there is a negative impact on private investment while others [20], [20, 29] confirmed a positive
impact on private investment.
RGROWTH (World Bank’s World Development Indicators, World bank database) is in-
cluded based on a litany of evidence [4, 27, 15] that suggests a highly significant link between
annual GDP growth rate and levels of private investment. For example, [15] suggest that
economic growth causes capital accumulation.
Finally, in order to choose between efficiency and consistency of MG, PMG, and DFE
estimators, this study employs the Hausman restriction test on coefficients based on the ARDL
model. It aims to check and make comparison between the significant differences between PMG,
MG, and DFE estimators. It then aims to select the best of them. If empirical findings indicate
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the existence of homogeneity in the long-term relationship, the application of the PMG method
provides efficient and consistent estimates over the two rest estimators. If the null hypothesis
about the homogeneity of regression parameters in the long run is rejected, the PMG estimate
becomes inconsistent. So, the MG or the DFE method is applied, which provides consistent
estimates under these conditions.
4. Results and Discussion
Three different sets of first and second generation panel unit roots are utilized to test variable
stationarity. They are: Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) test [22], Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test [26] and
Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test [36]. Two tests of the first generation (IPS and LLC tests) assume
cross sectional independence while the CIPS test allows cross sectional dependence. The study
was not able to reject the null hypothesis for the GFXPrivate, PDGDP and RGROWTH series
for the constant and trend term when expressed in level form (IPS test) and GFXPrivate for
constant in the case of Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test. However, the null hypothesis is rejected
after first differencing. All three panel tests reject the null hypothesis of nonstaniority for the
first differenced variables. This means that our panel variables are stationary and integrated of
an order one (I) at the 1% significance level except for the variable PDGP (IPS test) which is
significant at the 10 % level (Table 2). The second generation Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test was
examined by using the constant term and with the constant term and trend. The findings of
Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test reveals that the variables are stationary and integrated of an order
one (I). Moreover, it allows us to conduct the Pedroni test [32] and Kao Residual Cointegration
Test [23] in order to examine whether or not there is a cointegration equation among the selected
variables.
Table 2: Panel Unit Root Tests







and trend and trend and trend
At level
GFXPrivate -1.7897** 0.0335 -3.1689*** -2.9355*** -2.032 -2.637*
PDGDP -1.2214 -0.1547 -2.8103*** -2.5189*** -3.197*** -3.009***
RGROWTH -2.9523*** -1.2742 -4.2271*** -3.4262*** -3.377*** -4.977***
GOVEXPEND -5.1665*** -3.3687*** -5.8560*** -4.8506 *** -3.377*** -3.404***
At first differences
GFXPrivate -7.0855*** -4.7667*** -7.9007*** -6.4821*** -4.952*** -5.017***
PDGDP -3.5449*** -1.3681* -2.5059*** -1.6966** -3.980*** -4.260***
RGROWTH
-10.7546*** -7.8070*** -11.0528*** -8.4045*** -3.404*** -4.946***
GOVEXPEND -9.0166*** -6.1329*** -9.3959 *** -7.1152*** -4.977 *** -4.946***
Source: Authors’ calculations: Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat, ADF-Fisher Chi square, the null hy-
pothesis is presence of unit root, *, **, *** indicates significant at 10%, 5%. 1% at level.
The long run relationship between the variables GFXPrivate and PDGDP was examined by
employing two panel cointegration tests: a Pedroni test [31] and a Kao Residual Cointegration
Test [23]. First, the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of
cointegration was tested by using Pedroni’s test [32] through Group mean statistics that average
the results of individual test statistics and Panel statistics that pools the statistics with the
within dimension. It rejects the null of hypothesis of no cointegration between used variables in
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terms of Panel and Group ADF and PP statistics. In fact, the outcome of the Pedroni cointegra-
tion test indicates that two out of the four panel statistics and two of the three group statistics
(with ADF – t and PP –t statistics) confirm the existence of panel cointegration (Table 3). In
addition, the cointegration assumption between private investment and explanatory variables
was tested by Kao, Spurious regression and residual-based tests for co-integration in panel data
for estimating their long-run behavior.
Table 3: Panel cointegration tests
Tests
ADF Statistics
Kao Residual Cointegration Test
-2.515263***
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Tests
Within Dimension Between-Dimension
ADF Statistics -6.456864*** -4.799587***
PP Statistics -7.403208*** -8.415791***
Source: Authors’ calculations*** indicates significant at 1%
at level.
In accordance with the results obtained (Table 3), the Null hypothesis is strongly rejected
for all explanatory variables in favor of the alternative hypothesis (panels in the data are co
integrated).
Keeping in mind that cointegration is confirmed by both panel cointegration test results,
the study continued to utilize the panel ARDL model in order to examine the long run and
the short run relationship between private investment and public debt. Table 4 reports the
estimation output of MG, PMG and DFE models where these models provide the short run
and long run impacts of public debt on private investment. These three alternative dynamic
panel data estimators are utilized to explore dynamic effects from a general ARDL model.
Moreover, the Hausman test is utilized in order to choose the most efficient and consistent
estimator of MG, PMG and DFE. In the first panel (the European post transition countries)
the findings of Hausman test chi2(2) = 3.62 and Prob> chi2(2) = 0.3060 implies that the PMG
estimator is more suitable than the MG estimator. Also, between the PMG and the DFE
estimators, the Hausman test with score of chi2(2)= 0.331 and Prob>chi2 = 0.675 indicates
that the PMG is a more efficient estimator than the MG and the DFE. Similarly, it was
confirmed in the second panel (the European transition countries) between the PMG and the
MG estimators where the Hausman test had a score of chi2(2) = 3.74 and Prob>chi2 = 0.2912
as well as between the PMG and the DFE estimators with a score of chi2(2)= 2.04; Prob>chi2
= 0.5648.
In both panels, the null hypothesis related to the non-existence of systematic differences
between estimators (MG, PMG and DFE) is not rejected at the 1% level. This seems to imply
that the long run estimates are more homogenous because the PMG estimator is most efficient
and consistent.
The error correction term for the two subpanels (the European post-transition countries
and the European transition countries) is significant with a value of negative 0.291, and 0.353,
respectively in the PMG estimates. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship
is rejected.
These outputs imply that effects convergence to the long run equilibrium path occurs at
speed of 29.1% (European post transition countries) and 35.3% (European transition countries)
annually. In addition, it generally confirms that the error corrections terms fall into the dynamic
stable range indicating that the long-run effects of public debt on private investment exist
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Table 4: The Panel ARDL estimation
European post-transition countries European transition countries
Long Run Equation
MG PMG DFE MG PMG DFE
PDGDP
.0182609 -.0254105 .0130773 -8.049085 -.1061752 -.03582
[.08015] [.00941]*** [.05108] [8.0891] [.02278]*** [.06087]
RGROWTH
1.870269 .1901563 1.513631 -89.97583 .4674058 .8403062
[.987030]** [.08619]** [.38755] *** [90.4109] [.18479] ** [.36595]**
GOVEXPEND
-.0424091 .1939209 .2100794 .3721736 -.4039376 -.3449487
[.63126]* [.10078] ** [.29841] [.429944] [.150637]*** [.22577]
Short Run Equation
ECT
-.483532 -.291264 -.227935 -.460398 -.353341 -.2795455
[.090952]*** [.07441]*** [.04699]*** [.12061] *** [.08575] *** [.055924] ***
D1. PDGDP
.0497312 -.1418093 -.015654 .1118333 .0361011 .0264485
[.0528359] [.047412] *** [.0385964] [.1194039] [.0495437] [.017899]
D1.
RGROWTH
-.1336105 -.0064287 -.0664832 -.0556596 -.006026 -.0103366
[.0555562]** [.0230154] [.0377973]* [.0628616] [.0685786] [.0661566]
D1. GOVEX-
PEND
.0739298 -.0502171 .0304873 -.2116513 -.0757268 -.0659848
[.0995991] [.0832334] [.0609115] [.1648824] [.1314988] [.0759267]
cons
3.452725 3.229755 1.335761 7.387864 12.50888 8.444618
[6.81961] [.793672]*** [2.81405] [7.45455] [2.6893] *** [3.49601] **
Number of
observations
171 171 171 140 140 140
Hausman test
PMG vs, MG
chi2(2)= 3.62; Prob>chi2 = 0.3060 chi2(2) = 3.74; Prob>chi2 = 0.2912
Hausman test
PMG vs, DFE
chi2(2)= 0.331; Prob>chi2 = 0.675 chi2(2)= 2.04; Prob>chi2 = 0.5648
Source: Authors’ calculations , *, **, *** indicates significant at 10%, 5%. 1% at level.
The standard error is shown in parentheses [ ]
for the MG, PMG, and DFE estimates. In the long term relationship, the findings of the
PMG estimator indicate an inverse statistical significant link between public debt and private
investment for both panels (crowd out effect) while we held RGROWTH and GOVEXPEND
as control variables in the debt-investment model.
In the long run, it indicates that the variable of PDGP exerts a strong negative and statis-
tically significant relationship on private investment at 1% for both panels. This relationship is
in conformity with earlier studies done by [11, 14, 19], and many others. Hence, this estimate
implies that for European post transition countries 1% change in public debt leads to a 0.025%
decrease in private investment and a 0.10% decrease for the European transition countries (Table
5). It also implies that the elasticity of private investment with respect to public debt is greater
in European transition countries than in European post-transition countries. Revealingly, a
variable of RGROWTH exerts a statistically positive impact on private investment in both
panels at the 5% level (crowd in effect). Furthermore, according to the PMG estimates, the
effect of government spending on private investment in European post-transition countries is
significantly positive (crowd in effect), while in European transition countries it is significantly
negative (crowd out effect).
As shown in Table 5, a 1% increase in GOVEXPEND leads to increased private gross fixed
capital formation by 0.19% for the European post-transition countries and a decrease of 0.4%
for the European transition countries. This relationship in the long run for the European
post-transition countries confirms the earlier findings of [29] and [20] while for the European
transition countries it confirms the findings of [12, 7, 9] and [19].
However, according to the results for European post-transition countries in the MG estima-
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tor, evidence shows that only control variables of RGROWTH (crowd in effect) and GOVEX-
PEND (crowd out effect) have a significant effect on private investment, while with the DFE
estimator, only control the variable of RGROWTH (crowd in effect). In the case of European
transition countries, the study did not find any significance in the relationship between selected
variables and public debt in the MG model while there is a significant relationship between
RGROWTH and private investment in DFE model at the 5% level (crowd in effect).
In the short run, there are some mixed and unclear findings relating to both panels. The
findings from Table 5 suggest that in the short run an increase in public debt moves inversely
with GFXPrivate in the region (crowd out effect) only for the European post-transition countries
at the 1% level in PMG estimates but not for European transition countries. In fact, the PMG
estimates for a short run suggest that a 1% change in public debt leads to a 0.14% decrease in
private investment European post-transition countries. This is in line with the findings of [3],
and [11].
In fact, according to PMG estimates, there is no significant relationship between control
variables and private investment (in the short run) while the variable RGROWTH is shown as
statistically significant at the 5% level in MG estimates and 10% level in DFE estimates for the
European post-transition countries (crowd out effect).
Interestingly, the results for European transition countries in the short run reveals that there
is not any significance relationship between variables. This implies that there are no instant
responses of private investment to variations in any types of variables in all the estimators.
The last one in the short run can be explained with some conclusions that, due to the increase
in public debt stocks, the government needs to increase its spending for the purpose of debt
servicing and debt repayments. While the variable total government expenditure was statisti-
cally significant in the long run for the European post-transition countries, it is negative and
statistically insignificant in the short run.
Generally, while both groups of countries have relatively similar practices regarding how
they link private investment and public debt, in the long run while they differ significantly
in the short run. Therefore, the differences in findings might be attributable to the scope of
countries included in this research. In fact, the findings of our study are inconsistent with the
aforementioned investigation done by [15], and [19] in terms of correlation between growth rate
and private investment in the short run. One explanation for this is that the level of GDP across
the European transition and European post-transition countries is low and differ in account to
panel heterogeneity.
5. Conclusion
The study examined the link between private investment and public debt using three ARDL
estimators comparing European post-transition rather than the European transition countries.
The Hausman test confirmed that PMG estimates are more efficient and consistent than MG
and DFE in both panels.
The empirical evidence of the study generally confirms the existence of a crowding out effect
in European post-transition countries in both the short run and the long run. More specifically,
the elasticity of private investment with respect to public debt is greater in European transition
countries than in European post-transition countries. In the short run, evidence on direct effect
public debt on private investment is weak (European transition countries). In fact, there is little
to no evidence that public debt crowds out private investment when we use RGROWTH and
GOVEXPEND as control variables. In addition, there are some mixed and inconsistent findings
in both long run and short run related time frames with the crowding effect of government
spending on private investment. In European transition countries, government spending crowds
out private investment (in the long run) and crowds in private investment (the European post-
transition countries). Additionally, it appears that GDP growth exerts a crowding in effect
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in the long run in European post-transition countries while in the short run there are some
mixed and inconsistent the findings. In addition, our findings suggest that there is a crowding
in effect for the variable of government spending in the short run (the European post-transition
countries- PMG estimator) but not for the European transition countries.
Accordingly, the study recommends that selected countries should reassess their austerity
agendas employed for lowering debt levels and follow new strategies for managing their public
debt burdens. In conclusion, further research should look into the effects of various components
of government spending on private investments. Further research should also consider the
uncertainty and political situation of each country in order to investigate the crowding out
(or-in) effect of private investment.
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